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Meta-analytic data highlight the value of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) as an indirect
measure of personality. Based on evidence suggesting that confounding factors such as
cognitive abilities contribute to the IAT effect, this study provides a first investigation of
whether basic personality traits explain unwanted variance in the IAT. In a gender-balanced
sample of 204 volunteers, the Big-Five dimensions were assessed via self-report,
peer-report, and IAT. By means of structural equation modeling (SEM), latent Big-Five
personality factors (based on self- and peer-report) were estimated and their predictive
value for unwanted variance in the IAT was examined. In a first analysis, unwanted variance
was defined in the sense of method-specific variance which may result from differences
in task demands between the two IAT block conditions and which can be mirrored by the
absolute size of the IAT effects. In a second analysis, unwanted variance was examined
in a broader sense defined as those systematic variance components in the raw IAT
scores that are not explained by the latent implicit personality factors. In contrast to
the absolute IAT scores, this also considers biases associated with the direction of IAT
effects (i.e., whether they are positive or negative in sign), biases that might result, for
example, from the IAT’s stimulus or category features. None of the explicit Big-Five factors
was predictive for method-specific variance in the IATs (first analysis). However, when
considering unwanted variance that goes beyond pure method-specific variance (second
analysis), a substantial effect of neuroticism occurred that may have been driven by the
affective valence of IAT attribute categories and the facilitated processing of negative
stimuli, typically associated with neuroticism. The findings thus point to the necessity of
using attribute category labels and stimuli of similar affective valence in personality IATs
to avoid confounding due to recoding.
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INTRODUCTION
During the last decade, much attention has been focused on
indirect measures of personality as it has been shown that per-
sonality will be better understood if both explicit and implicit
aspects of a construct are considered. Specifically, as condensed
in the Reflective-Impulsive Model (Strack and Deutsch, 2004)
and the Behavioral Process Model of Personality (Back et al.,
2009), human behavior can be conceptualized as a function of
two distinct systems: First, a reflective system is supposed that elic-
its behavior as a consequence of deliberated decision-processes
leading to explicit memory representations that can be best
measured via self-report questionnaires. Second, a fast acting
impulsive system is assumed that activates behavioral schemata
by spread-of-activation processes without the need of individ-
ual’s intention. Such processes are assumed to be accumulated
as implicit memory representations that can best be accessed
via indirect measures. In fact, indirect measures of personality
have been shown to provide incremental validity over and above
self-reports predicting the more involuntary automatic aspects
of personality-related behavior (for an overview, see Greenwald
et al., 2009; see also Asendorpf et al., 2002; Perugini, 2005; Back
et al., 2009; Fleischhauer et al., 2013; but for a controversial dis-
cussion of the Implicit Association Test (IAT’s) predictive validity,
see Oswald et al., 2013).
In particular, the IAT introduced by Greenwald et al. (1998)
has attracted considerable attention. The IAT measures the rel-
ative strength of associations between bipolar target categories
(for personality IATs, typically the categories Self vs. Others)
and bipolar attribute categories (for trait anxiety, e.g., Anxiety
vs. Calmness). Individual exemplars of the categories are pre-
sented in the center of a computer screen and participants are
instructed to sort these items according to their category mem-
bership. Although the items must be assigned to four different
categories, participants have only two response keys to do so.
Consequently, each target category shares the response key with
one attribute category; and key assignment of the attribute cat-
egories is changed within the IAT procedure (for an illustration,
see Figure 1). Typically, the IAT contains five blocks: In block 1,
participants practice the response key assignment of the two tar-
get categories (target discrimination). With respect to the anxiety
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FIGURE 1 | Illustration of the Implicit Association Test with the target
categories “Self” and “Others” and the attribute categories “Anxiety”
and “Calmness” to which stimuli (e.g., afraid) must be categorized by
using two response keys. Note that the position (left, right) of the attribute
categories is changed within the paradigm.
IAT outlined above, for example, individuals must press the left
key for items of the category “Self” and the right key for items
of the category “Others.” In block 2, attribute key assignment is
practiced (attribute discrimination) with left responses for items
of the category “Anxiety” and right responses for exemplars of
“Calmness.” In block 3, both target- and attribute discrimina-
tion is combined. In block 4, then, the key assignment of the
attribute categories is changed and individuals now must press
the left key for items of the category “Calmness” and the right key
for exemplars of “Anxiety.” Again, in block 5, target and attribute
discrimination tasks are combined. However, individuals must
respond with the left key to exemplars of “Self” and “Calmness”
and with the right key to exemplars of “Others” and Anxiety.” In
standard IAT procedures, stimuli of the target- and attribute cate-
gories are presented in alternating order, that is, individuals must
switch between attribute and target discrimination for each trial.
It is assumed that an individual’s response is faster when two
strongly associated categories share one response key (individual’s
compatible block, for a highly anxious individual this would be
the block where Self is combined with Anxiety) than when these
concepts share different keys (individual’s incompatible block).
The IAT effect as the outcome measure of the IAT then reflects the
performance difference between the two category combinations.
Despite the promising results regarding reliability and pre-
dictive validity (see e.g., Schnabel et al., 2008), a growing body
of research indicates that the IAT effect might also contain
construct-unrelated variance, mainly resulting from the IAT’s
block design and the compatibility of category combination.
More precisely, compatibility has been found to influence speed-
accuracy settings with slower and more accurate responses (con-
servative response criterion) in the incompatible block and fast
and less accurate responses (liberal response criterion) in the
compatible block (Brendl et al., 2001; Klauer et al., 2007).
Furthermore, it has been noted that the two combined IAT blocks
asymmetrically allow for the use of recoding strategies (see De
Houwer, 2001; Mierke and Klauer, 2001, 2003; Rothermund and
Wentura, 2001, 2004). For a personality IAT measuring anxiety,
Schnabel et al. (2006) found evidence for recoding based on the
affective valence (negative vs. positive) of the attribute concepts
instead of their semantic meaning (anxious vs. self-confident) as
intended. Because individuals may typically have a rather positive
self-concept, items can be categorized in terms of the single fea-
ture dichotomy “positive” vs. “negative” in the IAT block, where
the more positive attribute concept “self-confident” is combined
with the target category “Me” (and the negatively valenced cate-
gory “anxious” with “Others”). Because of the common feature
“positive” vs. “negative” in this block, individuals do not have
to switch between the target- and the attribute-categorization
rule when categorizing stimuli (Mierke and Klauer, 2001). In
the IAT block combining the more negative attribute “anxious”
with “Me,” however, recoding is impossible and participants must
switch between the two discrimination tasks (i.e., sorting items to
the target vs. the attribute concepts).
Taking into account that the two combined blocks require
different demands on cognitive control, it appears obvious that
individual differences in executive functions may systematically
influence the IAT effect. The more cognitive skills will be applied
during the more demanding IAT block, the smaller the IAT effect
will be (see McFarland and Crouch, 2002; Klauer et al., 2007;
Sherman et al., 2008). This demonstrates that the IAT’s block
design can cause unwanted variance in the IAT effect (so called
method-specific variance) that potentially impairs the IAT’s valid-
ity. In a recent study, Klauer et al. (2010) examined whether the
three higher-order executive control functions (shifting, updat-
ing, and inhibition) being proposed by Miyake et al. (2000)
explained method variance in the IAT. For IAT scores calcu-
lated with the now standardly used D-algorithm [developed by
Greenwald et al. (2003)], the authors found individual differences
in task-switching ability to explain method-specific variance in
the IAT resulting in decreasing IAT effects with increasing switch-
ing ability. Compared to the conventional algorithm (Greenwald
et al., 1998), however, the D-algorithm was proven to substan-
tially reduce (but not to eliminate) the amount of unwanted
method-variance in the IAT effect in this study (see also Back
et al., 2005).
Similar to the role of individual differences in executive func-
tions, it is widely accepted that interindividual variability in
personality and temperamental traits strongly contribute to vari-
ation in human behavior. Several lines of evidence demonstrate a
relationship between personality and executive control functions
suggesting that personality may be a source of method variance
in the IAT. For example, converging evidence shows that negative
emotionality (e.g., trait anxiety) can impair set shifting behavior
(Eysenck et al., 2006), working memory updating (Gray et al.,
2005), and inhibitory control (Wood et al., 2001). Accordingly,
in their attentional control theory (ACT), Eysenck et al. (2007)
proposed that anxiety can disrupt the balance between two atten-
tional systems proposed by Corbetta and Shulman (2002), by
decreasing the influence of the goal-directed attentional system
(top-down control), but increasing the impact of the stimulus-
driven attentional system (bottom-up control). According to
ACT, this, in turn, results in less attentional control, higher dis-
tractibility by task-irrelevant stimuli and reduced ability to inhibit
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prepotent responses, especially in tasks with high demands on the
central executive (Eysenck et al., 2007; p. 348).
In addition, a large body of evidence demonstrates that indi-
viduals high vs. low in anxiety show preferential or facilitated
processing for negative and threat-related stimuli, which is associ-
ated with faster responding compared to neutral or positive ones
(e.g., MacLeod and Rutherford, 1992; Mogg and Bradley, 1998).
Given that personality IATs often implement category labels and
stimuli of affective valence and that this valence might trigger
recoding strategies contributing to the IAT in an unwanted man-
ner (see Schnabel et al., 2006), negative emotionality also appears
to be a relevant factor for unwanted variance in the IAT that
relates to the features of the IAT material.
Further, a growing number of studies suggest an association
between extraversion and the amount of top-down control in
task performance. This relationship has already been suggested
in Eysenck’s arousal theory of extraversion (1967). According to
this theory, extraverts possess chronically lower levels of tonic
activity in the ascending reticular activation system and thus need
to have more cortical stimulation to attain their optimal level of
arousal relative to introverts. Consistently, extraverts as compared
to introverts were found to show better task performance under
conditions of higher cognitive load (e.g., faster responses in the 2-
and 3-back condition of an n-back working memory task). They
also performed better in multitasking contexts (Lieberman and
Rosenthal, 2001). Similarly, extraverts were found to better divide
attention between competing tasks (Szymura and Necka, 1998),
to be less distracted by task irrelevant stimuli such as background
music (Furnham and Strbac, 2002), and to have better short-term
memory capacity (e.g., Howarth and Eysenck, 1968). In contrast,
introverts have been shown to be superior in long-term mem-
ory (e.g., Howarth and Eysenck, 1968) and vigilance tasks (e.g.,
Bakan, 1959; Koelega, 1992).
Based on this evidence, it appears plausible that individu-
als higher in extraversion are better able to handle IAT task
demands. Specifically, for each IAT trial, individuals must decide
whether the stimulus belongs to one of the target- or to one of
the attribute concepts and whether the item requires respond-
ing with the left or the right response key. Thus, the IAT
can be compared with a multi-task setting where the ability
to divide attention, larger short-term memory capacity (i.e.,
the maintenance of rules and categories), and lower sensitiv-
ity to distraction are of advantage. Given that such cogni-
tive control processes are more likely to be involved in the
incompatible block where task demand is increased, individual
differences in extraversion may affect the IAT blocks asymmetri-
cally, possibly leading to unwanted method variance in the IAT
effect.
Taken together, personality differences may affect the IAT
effect not only by construct-related, but also by confounding vari-
ance due to personality-related modulation of cognitive functions
or by a particular mode of processing (e.g., facilitated process-
ing of negative vs. neutral/positive stimuli; differential processing
under low vs. high cognitive-load). To address this question,
the Big-Five personality dimensions were assessed via self-report,
peer-report and IAT and structural equation modeling (SEM) was
used to separate trait-specific from unwanted variance.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS AND PROCEDURE
The sample consisted of 270 students who gave written informed
consent prior to the beginning of the study and who received
either monetary compensation or course credit for participation.
Participants performed the “task-switching ability” IAT (TSA-
IAT, Back et al., 2005) and measures of need for cognition that
are reported elsewhere (Fleischhauer et al., 2013). After a 15 min
break providing sufficient time for recovery, the Big-Five IATs and
finally the NEO-FFI questionnaire were completed. Moreover,
all participants nominated two persons who were of about the
same age, who knew them well and agreed to rate their friends’
personality (peer-report). Five participants were excluded from
the sample because of missing IAT data or because their mean
error rate in IAT performance exceeded 30%. For 61 participants,
no peer-report of personality (which was required to estimate
the latent personality variables in the SEMs) could be obtained.
Hence, the final sample comprised 204 participants (95 males, age
mean ± SD 23.1 ± 4.0 years, range 18–42 years).
MEASURES
Indirect measures
The implicit Big-Five dimensions were measured with IAT sub-
tests developed by Schmukle et al. (2008), which were pre-
sented in the following order (the IATs contained the target
concepts “Self” vs. “Others” and the attribute concepts depicted
in parentheses): (1) Eimp (Extraversion vs. Introversion), (2)
Nimp (Anxiety vs. Calmness), (3) Oimp (Openness vs. Narrow-
Mindedness), (4) Aimp (Agreeableness vs. Disagreeableness), (5)
Cimp (Conscientiousness vs. Carelessness). In the TSA-IAT (Back
et al., 2005), participants sort stimuli from letter and number cat-
egories (e.g., N, 5) as well as from word and calculation categories
(e.g., shirt, 7 − 4 = 3). The IAT data were aggregated according
to the D1 algorithm (see Greenwald et al., 2003). For the person-
ality IATs, mean reaction time (RT) of the block combining “Self”
with the attribute indicating high values in the respective trait
(e.g., “Openness”) was subtracted from RT in the block combin-
ing “Self” with the opposite attribute (e.g., Narrow-Mindedness).
Thus, positive IAT effects indicate a tendency toward high values
in implicit Openness whereas negative IAT effects indicate a ten-
dency toward low values in implicit Openness. Internal consisten-
cies of the IATs (see Table 1) were computed as Spearman-Brown
corrected split-half correlations based on two subsets of alternat-
ing trial-pairs in the combined blocks (i.e., subset 1 containing
the trials 1, 2, 5, 6, [. . . ] and subset 2 including the trials 3, 4, 7,
8, [. . .]).
Direct measures
The explicit Big-Five factors neuroticism (Nexp), extraversion
(Eexp), openness (Oexp), agreeableness (Aexp), and conscien-
tiousness (Cexp) were assessed by the German NEO-Five-
Factor-Inventory (NEO-FFI, Borkenau and Ostendorf, 1993).
Additionally, peer-reports of the NEO-FFI were collected. Peer-
reports have been shown to be a valuable supplemental source of
information about an individual’s personality potentially increas-
ing the validity of personality assessment (see e.g., Kolar et al.,
1996; Vazire, 2006; Vazire and Mehl, 2008). The nominated peers
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Table 1 | Means, standard deviations, reliabilities, and intercorrelations of all measures.
SR PR IAT
M SD N E O A C N E O A C N E O A C TSA
SR
N 22.2 8.9 0.86
E 29.7 6.8 −0.44 0.82
O 32.8 6.1 −0.05 0.14 0.69
A 31.3 6.5 −0.18 0.38 0.11 0.79
C 30.5 7.5 −0.11 0.17 −0.15 0.11 0.86
PR
N 21.7 8.4 0.44 −0.27 0.06 −0.04 −0.02 0.86
E 29.1 7.1 −0.22 0.51 −0.04 0.28 0.09 −0.42 0.82
O 30.3 6.3 0.03 0.02 0.56 0.05 −0.22 0.02 0.12 0.71
A 31.4 7.1 −0.03 0.26 −0.04 0.52 −0.01 −0.24 0.44 0.10 0.80
C 33.4 8.3 0.07 −0.09 −0.14 −0.01 0.52 −0.05 0.09 −0.05 0.13 0.88
IAT
N −0.20 0.26 0.16 −0.11 0.06 0.05 −0.05 0.13 −0.06 0.01 −0.01 0.01 0.56
E 0.08 0.34 −0.24 0.29 −0.03 0.11 0.01 −0.26 0.22 −0.05 0.08 −0.11 −0.13 0.76
O 0.23 0.25 −0.11 0.08 0.01 −0.02 0.09 −0.19 0.14 −0.08 0.03 −0.06 −0.16 0.23 0.61
A 0.34 0.26 0.05 −0.05 0.03 0.01 0.15 0.15 −0.04 0.11 −0.03 −0.03 −0.12 0.08 0.23 0.63
C 0.27 0.25 0.03 0.01 −0.04 −0.05 0.16 −0.02 0.02 −0.09 −0.03 −0.01 −0.10 0.09 0.29 0.25 0.63
TSA 1.01 0.20 −0.13 0.09 0.08 −0.02 −0.07 −0.09 0.06 −0.01 −0.02 −0.07 −0.17 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.15 0.69
SR, self-report; PR, peer-report; IAT, Implicit Association Test; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness; A, agreeableness; C, conscientiousness; TSA, content-
unrelated control IAT; reliabilities of self- and peer-reports (Cronbach’s alpha) and of IATs (Spearman-Brown corrected split-half correlation) are shown in the diagonal,
significant correlations (p < 0.05) are depicted in bold.
were contacted per email by the researchers and asked to answer
the items of the NEO-FFI (in the third-person form) via online
questionnaire. For 204 participants, at least one peer-report was
available and considered for SEM. When both peer-reports were
available (N = 157), the friend was chosen who knew the partic-
ipant longest and best. The average number of years they knew
each other was 7.2 (SD = 7.1), and 92.2% of the informants
reported to know the rated person “well” (35.3%) or “very well”
(56.9%).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
To investigate effects of personality on unwanted IAT variance,
SEM with maximum likelihood estimation was performed using
lavaan (Rosseel, 2012) and R 2.15.1 (R Core Team, 2012). Model
fit was assessed by Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square test statis-
tics and the following descriptive fit indices (see Hu and Bentler,
1998, 1999; Schermelleh-Engel et al., 2003): Root Mean Square
Error of Approximation (RMSEA) with its associated 90% con-
fidence interval (CI), Standardized Root Mean Square Residual
(SRMR), and Comparative Fit Index (CFI). The scaled chi-square
difference test was used to compare the model fit of nested mod-
els (see Rosseel, 2012). Additionally, the sample-size adjusted
Bayesian Information Criterion (SABIC; Sclove, 1987) was used
as parsimony goodness of fit index with lower values indicating
better model fit.
Analysis 1: effects of personality on method variance in the IAT
In Analysis 1, according to the literature (e.g., Back et al., 2005;
Klauer et al., 2010), “unwanted variance” in the IAT was defined
as method-specific variance. As outlined in the Introduction,
method-specific variance is mainly attributable to the IAT’s block
design. That is, because of the higher amount of task demand
in the incompatible relative to the compatible block, individual
differences in, for example, task-switching ability (Klauer et al.,
2010) may affect the two IAT blocks asymmetrically, thereby
potentially biasing the IAT effect. The more cognitive control
is exerted in the incompatible block, the smaller RT differences
between both blocks (and thus IAT effects) should be (see e.g.,
De Houwer, 2001; Mierke and Klauer, 2001, 2003; Rothermund
and Wentura, 2001, 2004). To measure personality-related effects
on this method-specific variance, first, a measurement model was
constructed as follows: Latent explicit personality factors were
indicated by self- and peer-report because a multi-informant
approach allows separating trait from error variance leading to
more valid factors of explicit personality. Similarly to Back et al.
(2005) and Klauer et al. (2010), the personality IAT scores cal-
culated according to the D1 algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003)
were transformed into absolute values and used as indicators
for the latent factor of IAT method variance (IATabs). The abso-
lute values ignore the direction of the IAT effect (i.e., whether
an individual is rather anxious or not) but consider the size of
the IAT effect (whether the IAT effect is close to or far from
zero). Second, we tested whether additional regressions of the
IAT factor (IATabs) on the latent personality factors substan-
tially improved model fit, which would indicate that personality
influences method-specific variance in the IAT (see Figure 2,
see Supplementary Material for the R code and the covariance
matrix).
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FIGURE 2 | Structural equation model with the IAT factor (IATabs)
explaining variance in absolute IAT scores. Parameter estimates are fully
standardized. Note that for reasons of readability, intercorrelations among the
latent personality factors are not depicted. SR, self-report; PR, peer-report;
IAT, Implicit Association Test; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness; A,
agreeableness; C, conscientiousness.
Analysis 2: effects of personality on unwanted IAT variance in a
broader sense
In a second analysis, “unwanted variance” was defined in a broader
sense. That is, the personality IAT scores calculated by the D1
algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) were used in their raw for-
mat (i.e., taking into account the direction of IAT effects not
only their size) and unwanted variance was defined as system-
atic variance that cannot be explained by the implicit trait factors.
Such unwanted variance components, for example, may result
from individual differences in the processing of task-irrelevant
features (see De Houwer, 2009) such as the valence of cate-
gories/stimuli, which may promote recoding strategies (see e.g.,
Govan and Williams, 2004; Bluemke and Friese, 2006; Schnabel
et al., 2006) that, in turn, may bias the IAT effect in a more neg-
ative or more positive direction. Thus, this analysis would cover
aspects of variance that are not reflected by IATabs as considered
in Analysis 1.
Accordingly, first, a measurement model was constructed.
Based on findings suggesting that implicit and explicit repre-
sentations of the self-concept can best be conceived as dis-
tinct, but slightly correlated constructs (e.g., Nosek and Smyth,
2007; see also Hofmann et al., 2005; Back et al., 2009), latent
explicit and latent implicit personality factors were estimated.
Self- and peer-report served as indicators for the latent explicit
trait factors. Latent implicit personality factors were indicated
by the two IAT subsets used for computing split half relia-
bility (see above). Note that the intercorrelations among the
latent explicit personality factors as well as between the explicit
and implicit trait factors were initially freely estimated, but
constrained to zero in a stepwise fashion if their respective
correlation amounted to r < 0.05. Additionally, for each of
the three types of measures (self-report, peer-report, IAT), a
latent measurement factor was estimated, reflecting the system-
atic shared variance that is not explained by the latent trait
factors.
Second, the latent IAT measurement factor (IATraw) was
regressed on the latent explicit personality factors to estimate
the influence of personality on unwanted IAT variance (see
Figure 3, see Supplementary Material for the R code and the
covariance matrix). Note that we restricted the regressions
to the explicit personality factors as the IAT factor and the
implicit personality factors explain variance in the same indica-
tors, and thus covariation between those factors is difficult to
interpret.
Relationship between the IAT factors and the content-unrelated
TSA-IAT
Finally, by correlation analysis, the shared variance of the two
IAT factors (IATabs and IATraw) was examined. Moreover, inter-
correlations with the content-unrelated TSA-IAT were estimated
to gain further evidence for the amount of unwanted variance in
IATabs and IATraw.
RESULTS
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND INTERCORRELATIONS
Descriptive statistics, reliabilities, and intercorrelations for the
personality measures and the TSA-IAT are depicted in Table 1.
The pattern of intercorrelation between personality dimensions
largely replicates the results of studies using direct and indirect
Big-Five measures (Schmukle et al., 2008; Back et al., 2009).
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FIGURE 3 | Structural equation model with the IAT factor (IATraw)
explaining variance in raw IAT scores. Parameter estimates are
fully standardized. Note that for reasons of readability,
intercorrelations among the latent personality factors are not
depicted. Significant regression weights (p < 0.05) are depicted in
bold. SR, self-report; PR, peer-report; IAT1/2, Implicit Association Test
subtest 1/2; N, neuroticism; E, extraversion; O, openness; A,
agreeableness; C, conscientiousness.
EFFECTS OF PERSONALITY ON UNWANTED VARIANCE IN THE IAT
Analysis 1 ( IATabs)
As can be seen in Table 2, the model that was based on the
absolute scores of the IAT effects considering unwanted IAT
variance in the sense of more or less large IAT effects (i.e., sys-
tematic method variance) fitted the data well. However, when
regressions of IATabs on the five explicit personality factors were
additionally included, model fit did not substantially change
[χ2(5) = 4.30, p = 0.507] and none of the five regressions
reached significance (all ps > 0.20) indicating that personality
had no substantial influence on IATabs (see Figure 2). However,
in previous research (Back et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2010), it
has been shown that the D-measure (Greenwald et al., 2003)
compared to the conventional scoring algorithm (Greenwald
et al., 1998) may reduce the amount of method variance in
the IAT effect. That is, the null-relationship between the trait
factors and IATabs might not only refer to the fact that per-
sonality does not modulate whether individuals have smaller or
larger IAT effects. It might also suggest that that the D-measure
effectively controls for unwanted effects of personality on cog-
nitive functioning during the IAT and that effects of personality
would have occurred if the conventional scoring algorithm had
been used. To disentangle which of the two possibilities is most
likely, we repeated the modeling using the absolute values of
the conventionally scored IAT effects. Again, however, none of
the trait factors significantly predicted IATabs (all ps > 0.20) and
the model fit of the measurement model [χ2(80) = 72.94, p =
0.699, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00 (CI90%: 00, 0.03), SRMR =
0.05, SABIC = 11219.67] and of the structural model [χ2(75) =
69.53, p = 0.657, CFI = 1.00, RMSEA = 0.00 (CI90%: 00, 0.03),
SRMR = 0.04, SABIC = 11227.19] did not significantly differ
[χ2(5) = 3.346, p = 0.647].
Analysis 2 ( IATraw)
In a second analysis (where unwanted variance was consid-
ered in a broader sense), the measurement model assuming a
latent factor for each measurement (self-report, peer-report, and
IAT) and latent explicit and implicit personality factors fitted
the data well (see Table 2). Model fit was also excellent when
the regressions of IATraw on the latent factors of the explicit
Big-Five personality dimensions were additionally included (see
Table 2 and Figure 3). Considering the regression paths, Nexp
explained variance in IATraw (βNexp = −0.33, z = −2.27, p =
0.023) whereas the regression weights of the other predictors
did not reach significance (all ps > 0.30). Therefore, regression
path of IATraw on Eexp, Oexp, Aexp, and Cexp were eliminated
from the SEM. As indicated by likelihood ratio test [χ2(4) =
0.80, p = 0.938], this more constrained model fitted the data
equally well than the less constrained SEM (for fit indices, see
Table 2) and is thus to be preferred. A likelihood ratio test
comparing the final SEM with the measurement model fur-
ther shows that considering Nexp as predictor of IATraw sub-
stantially improved model fit [χ2(1) = 7.11, p = 0.008] and
accounted for a substantial amount of variance [R2(IATraw) =
11.3%]. Subsequent correlation analyses between IATraw and the
two indicators of latent Nexp further suggest that the effect results
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Table 2 | Model fit statistics.
df χ2 p RMSEA CI90% SRMR CFI SA BIC
(A) ANALYSIS 1 (IATabs)
Measurement model 80 77.34 0.563 0.00 0–0.04 0.05 1 13018.61
Structural model:Nexp, Eexp, Oexp, Aexp, Cexp 75 73.09 0.541 0.00 0–0.04 0.05 1 13024.55
(B) ANALYSIS 2 (IATraw)
Measurement model 157 180.70 0.095 0.03 0–0.04 0.07 0.97 14340.15
Structural models:Nexp, Eexp, Oexp, Aexp, Cexp 152 172.70 0.120 0.03 0–0.04 0.06 0.97 14342.71
Nexp only 156 173.44 0.161 0.02 0–0.04 0.06 0.98 14334.94
Model fit was assessed by Satorra-Bentler adjusted chi-square test statistics and RMSEA, root mean square error of approximation; CI90%, confidence interval of
RMSEA; SRMR, standardized root mean square residual; CFI, comparative fit index; and SABIC, sample-size adjusted Bayesian Information Criterion.
from both, self-reported neuroticism (r = −0.14, p = 0.056) and
(even more pronounced) peer-reported neuroticism (r = −0.18,
p = 0.012).
CORRELATIONS OF IAT FACTORS AND TSA-IAT
Both IAT factors were highly associated (r = 0.83, p < 0.001).
Moreover, they showed similar correlations with the content-
unrelated and neutral TSA-IAT (IATabs: r = 0.177, p = 0.011;
IATraw: r = 0.194, p = 0.005) indicating shared unwanted vari-
ance. Subsequent partial correlation analyses revealed that when
the variance of the respective other IAT factor was eliminated
(e.g., IATabs out of IATraw), correlation with the TSA-IAT were
reduced to insignificance (TSA and IATabs: r = 0.029, p = 0.685;
TSA and IATraw: r = 0.087, p = 0.219) suggesting that the corre-
lation with the TSA-IAT, reported above, was due to the shared
variance of both IAT factors. That is, IATraw might also contain
variance components that refer to the size of the IAT effects result-
ing from the block design of the IAT (i.e., due to different task
demands between the compatible and incompatible blocks).
DISCUSSION
Recent research has shown that the IAT may be affected by con-
founding factors. Given their large contribution to behavioral
variation, the aim of the present study was to examine the role
of personality differences in unwanted variance in the IAT. The
Big-Five personality dimensions were assessed with multiple mea-
sures (self-report, peer-report, and IAT). In a first analysis, we
examined effects of personality on unwanted variance that is
directly related to the IAT procedure (i.e., method variance). Such
variance components have been shown to mainly result from
the block design of the IAT, that is, the higher task demands
in the incompatible block compared to the compatible block
(e.g., Mierke and Klauer, 2003; Rothermund and Wentura, 2004;
De Houwer et al., 2005). Consequently, individual differences in
cognitive skills (e.g., Klauer et al., 2010) have been shown to
contribute to the IAT effect with smaller IAT effects for individ-
uals who exert a higher amount of cognitive skills in the more
demanding incompatible block. To assess method variance, IATs
were scored in terms of absolute values (i.e., its distance from zero,
ignoring the sign; see e.g., Back et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2007).
Given the literature, we expected neuroticism and extraver-
sion to explain method variance in the IAT. Specifically, neu-
roticism has been related to impaired performance in cognitive
tasks (Wood et al., 2001; Gray et al., 2005; Eysenck et al., 2006),
whereas extraversion has been observed to be positively associated
with performance under higher cognitive load and in multitask-
ing contexts (e.g., Lieberman and Rosenthal, 2001); settings that
might be comparable to the more difficult incompatible block of
the IAT. However, there was no evidence for confounding effects
of Nexp and Eexp or other personality factors of the Big Five on
method variance as reflected in IATabs. This was not only the
case when the IAT scores were calculated according to the D1
algorithm (Greenwald et al., 2003) that might have effectively
controlled for unwanted effects of personality during the IAT (see
also Back et al., 2005; Klauer et al., 2010). The null relationship
between personality and IATabs was also observed for the con-
ventional scoring algorithm (Greenwald et al., 1998). Thus, we
can only speculate why the expected impact of neuroticism and
extraversion on the size of the IAT effects (as reflected in IATabs)
was not observed in this sample. With respect to extraversion,
for example, in the study of Lieberman and Rosenthal (2001),
differences in task performance particularly occurred when the
task was the secondary but not the primary task in the multi-
tasking context and when a working memory task was used.
Thus, the null relationship between extraversion and IATabs might
be explained by the fact that in the demanding incompatible
block of the IAT, both, the target and attribute categorization
task are of similar priority and that working memory perfor-
mance appears to be less relevant for IAT performance relative
to task-switching (Klauer et al., 2010). All in all, with respect
to our sample, the results appear promising as they may sug-
gest that personality does not substantially affect cognitive control
processes that are triggered by the two differently demanding
IAT blocks and that are reflected in more or less large IAT
effects.
Additionally, we considered unwanted variance in a broader
sense: By means of SEM, systematic IAT variance that was unique
to the respective implicit trait (indicated by latent implicit trait
factors) was separated from systematic common variance that
goes beyond this trait variance (indicated by the latent IATraw
factor). Nexp was observed to explain a substantial amount of
variance (11%) in IATraw. Specifically, higher scores in Nexp pre-
dicted lower IATraw. However, the question is whether and to
what extent this kind of shared variance indeed reflects some-
thing “unwanted.” With respect to the factor loadings of the raw
IAT effects, it is noticeable that the neuroticism IAT contributed
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negatively to latent IATraw whereas all other IATs showed pos-
itive loadings. As the combination of “self” with the attribute
concept “anxiety” should be perceived more negative than the
combination of “self” with “extraversion,” “openness,” “agree-
ableness,” or “conscientiousness,” one may argue that the valence
of the attribute concepts may have contributed to IAT variance
relatively independent of the implicit personality factors to be
measured. In this context, Schnabel et al. (2006) argued that the
valence of the IAT’s attribute categories may be a source of con-
founding in the IAT effect due to possible recoding tendencies.
In their study, two IATs measuring anxiety and angriness, respec-
tively, were presented in counterbalanced order. Interestingly, the
two IATs showed substantial positive correlation when the anxiety
IAT was presented first. This was discussed as being due to a larger
amount of affective valence in the anxiousness IAT, which might
have encouraged participants to recode the attribute categories
from “anxious vs. self-confident” into “negative vs. positive” and
to classify stimuli of these categories according to their valence
rather than to their semantic meaning. A possible transfer of
this strategic recoding to the subsequently presented angriness
IAT may explain the positive correlation between both IATs.
Similarly, the Big-Five IATs used in this study provide attribute
category labels that contain a certain degree of affective valence.
Accordingly, largest factor loading on IATraw was observed for the
Openness IAT that contrasted the highly negatively valenced cat-
egory “Narrow-Mindedness” with the highly positively valenced
category “Openness.” Compared to the other Big-Five IATs, these
attribute labels vary highly in negative and positive valence, and
thus might have motivated individuals to recode the “Self and
Openness left” vs. “Others and Narrow-mindedness right” cate-
gorization into a “positive left” vs. “negative right” categorization.
As this common feature dichotomization (positive vs. negative)
was not possible in the block where individuals had to press
the left key for “Self and Narrow-Mindedness” and the right
key for “Others and Openness,” the valence confound affects the
two combined blocks asymmetrically and thus can contribute to
the IAT effect. A larger IAT effect then should reflect not only
the strength of associations between “Self” and “Openness” rel-
ative to “Self” and “Narrow-Mindedness” as intended, but also
the amount of positive valence conveyed by “Openness” relative
to “Narrow-Mindedness.” One may argue that due to a rather
positive self-concept of individuals, recoding according to the
single feature dichotomy “positive vs. negative” should typically
occur in the block where “Self” (“Others”) is combined with a
positively (negatively) valenced attribute category. Consequently,
given the scoring procedure used (see Materials and Methods),
recoding according to valence may result in a bias toward neg-
ative IAT scores (indicating low values in the respective implicit
trait) when performing the neuroticism IAT (where Calmness is
the positive attribute) but in a bias toward positive IAT score when
performing the other four Big-Five IATs.
In this regard, there is a considerable amount of evidence sug-
gesting that neuroticism or anxiety facilitates processing of neg-
ative and threat-related signals (e.g., MacLeod and Rutherford,
1992; Mogg and Bradley, 1998). Interestingly, Chan et al. (2007)
examined effects of neuroticism on the evaluation of personality
characteristics as desirable or undesirable and in the perception
of emotions in facial expressions. They found individuals high
in neuroticism to be faster in classifying negative/undesirable
personality traits as compared to positive/desirable traits and to
need more intense facial expressions to correctly classify posi-
tive emotions. Further, in a priming study, Robinson et al. (2007)
showed that neuroticism was positively correlated with negative,
but not with positive priming, which was discussed as reflect-
ing “a greater spread of activation among negative thoughts [. . . ]
within semantic memory” (p. 1229). Given these results, the neg-
ative relationship between Nexp and IATraw may be due to the fact
that individuals high and low in neuroticism differ with respect to
their processing of IAT conditions where “self” is combined with
a negative/undesirable attribute concept relative to blocks with
“self-positive” combinations. In specific, the facilitated processing
of negatively valenced information may lead to a less pronounced
bias toward negative IAT scores in the neuroticism IAT and
toward positive IAT scores in the other four Big-Five IATs in indi-
viduals high in neuroticism compared to their low neuroticism
counterparts.
Alternatively, our result pattern may suggest that individuals
high in Nexp tend to spontaneously associate negative rather than
positive traits with themselves (i.e., have a more negative implicit
self-concept). Although lower self-esteem is a known correlate
of neuroticism (Robins et al., 2001a,b), such variance in the IAT
can be regarded as confounding as it would indicate that the IAT
effect does not reflect the respective implicit Big-Five personality
domain only (e.g., implicit Openness) but also reflects the ease
with which one associates positive vs. negative stimuli with the
self-due to self-esteem (see Schnabel et al., 2006; p. 390; see also
Rudman et al., 2001).
Overall, our results suggest that the valence of the attribute
concepts may have caused additional unwanted variance in the
IAT effects as reflected by IATraw. Because neuroticism has been
found to especially facilitate the processing of negative stimuli
compared to stimuli with positive valence, this might explain why
neuroticism but not the other Big-Five domains was observed to
significantly predict such valence confounds in the IAT. There was
no personality-related association with IATabs reflecting system-
atic method variance. As indicated by additional correlation anal-
yses, both IAT factors shared a large amount of variance (69%)
and were significantly associated with the content-unrelated TSA-
IAT suggesting that IATraw also relates to the size of IAT effects.
Nevertheless, the results indicate that Nexp was predictive for that
proportion of IATraw that is not shared with IATabs. This, in turn,
may illustrate the usefulness of investigating unwanted variance
in a broader sense that goes beyond pure method variance and
additionally considers variance components that may be due, for
example, to features of the material (e.g., the valence of cate-
gory labels) resulting in more or less negative or positive IAT
effects.
To avoid bias due to the recoding according to the valence
of attribute labels (and/or items representing these categories),
these stimuli should be balanced by their affective valence. Such
valence balancing might be particularly necessary with respect to
personality IATs. That is, in self-esteem or attitude IATs, the self-
concept targets such as “Me vs. Not Me” (e.g., Schröder-Abé et al.,
2007) and attitude targets such as “Black vs. White Americans”
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(e.g., Greenwald et al., 1998, Experiment 3) are typically com-
bined with attribute categories containing affective valence such
as “Pleasant vs. Unpleasant.” In these IATs, however, the valence in
the attribute concepts is considered necessary to evaluate the tar-
get concepts (e.g., in the self-esteem IATs, it is measured whether
the self is implicitly perceived as being rather good or bad). In
personality IATs, however, where the association between the
self-concept and the semantic meaning instead of the valence
of attribute categories are of interest, labels and stimuli should
be controlled in terms of their valence (see also Perkins and
Forehand, 2006).
Several potential limitations of the present research must
be noted that may also suggest directions for future research.
An alternative option to separate content-related from content-
unrelated variance is to decompose the IAT effect into pro-
cess components using diffusion modeling, as demonstrated
by Klauer et al. (2007). The authors showed that particularly
the process component a reflecting speed-accuracy settings sig-
nificantly predicted method variance in the IAT whereas the
drift rate v reflecting the speed of information accumulation
was predictive for construct-related variance. To examine trait-
specific effects on these components would be interesting. This
was not possible in the present study as it would also have
required the recording of the response latency on first erro-
neous responses as well as a larger number of trials than in
standard IAT implementations to obtain a sufficient number
of error trials necessary for modeling (see Klauer et al., 2007).
However, prolonged IAT procedures may be more likely to
be influenced by effects of task demand and motivation than
standard IATs.
Moreover, it would be important to investigate to what extent
effects of neuroticism affect the IAT’s validity, for example, by
moderating behavioral predictions of the IAT or explicit-implicit
consistencies. In this context, one might examine effects of neu-
roticism in the context of attitude IATs that typically use nega-
tive and positive affective attribute categories and stimuli. Such
an approach would also contribute to the question whether
neuroticism exerts its effects on the processing of valenced
stimuli in general (then effects would similarly occur for atti-
tude IATs) or whether the found association between Nexp and
IATraw results from a more negative implicit self-concept of
individuals high in neuroticism (then effects would be specific
for personality IATs containing differently valenced attribute
categories).
In addition, the study is limited in elucidating whether the
valence of the category labels or rather the valence of the exem-
plars (or both) have caused the association between Nexp and
IATraw. In this regard, previous research found evidence that
the category names mainly determine how the stimuli are cat-
egorized (e.g., De Houwer, 2001) but that the features of the
individual exemplars can substantially alter the interpretation of
categories especially when the exemplar features are inconsistent
to the category features (e.g., Steffens and Plewe, 2001). With
respect to the Big-Five IATs used in this study (see Schmukle et al.,
2008), category labels but also the individual exemplars of the
two attribute concepts contained affective valence. As, however,
the categories and exemplars were consistent in this feature (e.g.,
Openness = civilized, well-educated vs. Narrow-Mindedness =
primitive, uneducated), one might argue that neuroticism has
affected the perception of both. This might be addressed by
experimental manipulations in future studies (see Perkins and
Forehand, 2006).
In conclusion, our study aimed to investigate the role of per-
sonality in explaining unwanted variance in personality IATs.
There were no personality-related effects on IAT method variance
as reflected in absolute IAT scores. However, we observed explicit
neuroticism to be predictive for unwanted variance in the raw IAT
scores indicating shared variance components that go beyond this
method-specific variance and that might be due, for example, to
features of the used category labels and/or stimuli. In this con-
text, our results suggest that the observed effect of neuroticism
on IATraw may have been driven by the affective valence of the
attribute categories (and stimuli) in the personality IATs and by
the facilitated processing of negative compared to positive/neutral
information as frequently observed for individuals high in neu-
roticism. Thus, category labels and the individual exemplars of
the attribute concepts of personality IATs should, at best, be bal-
anced for affective valence to avoid confounding, for example, due
to recoding (see also Steffens, 2004; Schnabel et al., 2006).
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